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Introduction
The relationship between Japan's central government and its local
governments plays an important role in the management of Japanese local
public finance1'. In its provision of intergovernmental grants, the central
government encourages local government to perform corresponding to
national policies. Local governments, on the other hand, can utilize grants
in accordance with their own fiscal management by choosing the projects
they deem necessary from many possible granted undertakings. Thus, the
interdependent central-local government relationship in Japan has affected
the management of local public finance in the area of grant policy. Other
policies in Japanese local public finance such as policies with regard to
local development, the environment and welfare also have been
formulated through the interdependent central-local policy links
(Muramatsu 1988).
Recent developments in the theory of firms could clarify the
interdependent relationships among constituents in organizational decision
making. Such studies apply economic analyses to Japanese corporate
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governance and to Japanese government-industry relationships (Aoki and
Okuno 1996, Okuno-Fujiwara 1996). Can we apply their arguments to the
question of Japan's central-local government relationship?
This research note studies the Japanese central-local relationship by
examining local tax policy. Reforming the system of local taxation as well
as the system of intergovernmental grant making causes conflicts of
interests between the central government and local governments. Thus,
these reforms can be realized only when political coordination is obtained
between authorities concerned. We focus on local tax reforms in the early
postwar period, particularly the period between the end of World War II
and the mid-1950s. This is because that period experienced drastic
reforms of the local tax system and intergovernmental systems to establish
the revenue infrastructure of postwar Japanese local public finance.
We conduct our study of the central-local relationship from two
perspectives. First, we identify a model that explains the Japanese central-
local relationship. The theory of local public finance has provided
orthodox models of central-local relationships, namely, a "monolithic
model," which assumes developing countries, and a "fiscal federalism
model," which assumes federations. Neither of these models, however, can
fully account for the Japanese central-local government relationship. In
that relationships, local governments maintain a certain discretion in
deciding their expenditure patterns and in securing their revenues.
However, a high degree of integration between the central government
and local governments has been common in the postwar period. Both the
central and local administrative bodies have cooperatively played a
significant role by formulating the substance of the legislative agendas of
the Japanese local tax system. Therefore, we can conclude that the
Japanese central-local government relationship falls in between a
monolithic model and a fiscal federalism model. The relationship is well
described by a "relation-dependent model," which was first applied to
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Japanese government and business relationships by Okuno-Fujiwara
(1996).
Second, on the basis of the relation-dependent model, we account for
how both the central government and local governments took part in the
implementation of local tax reforms in the early postwar period. The
Japanese central government and local governments have contrasting
interests in carrying out local tax reforms. The central government
advocates alleviating the local tax burden to restrain the financial burden
of financial transfers to local governments. Local governments, on the
contrary, welcome the expansion of local tax revenue accompanying local
revenue adequacy. Political compromises between the central government
and local governments, therefore, have to satisfy both regional equity of
tax burdens and revenue adequacy of local governments. In our analysis,
we calculated Gini coefficients for per capita local tax revenue and also
examined relative ratios of per capita local tax revenue between citiesand
municipalities to examine the level of taxpayer equity among localities.
We also examined the size of local fiscal deficits and the number of
deficit-financing local bodies to check the level of revenue adequacy of
local governments.
The next section characterizes a relation-dependent model to explain
the central-local relationship in Japanese local public finance. The third
section describes the significance of the Shoup local tax reform in 1950
by defining it as the important starting point of Japan's postwar local tax
system. The fourth section empirically accounts for local tax reforms
occurred in the early postwar period. The final section theoretically
conceptualizes relation-dependent political coordination processes between
the central government and local governments to carry out local tax
reforms in the early postwar period.
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Central - local government relationships in Japanese local public
finance
The Japanese local tax system has contributed to the provision of stable
funding for local government activitiesin postwar local public finance. In
this it is similar to other resources such as local allocation tax, local
transfer tax, specific purpose grants and local government bonds. The
establishment of this financial system was a compromise between the
opposing views of the central government, private businesses and interest
groups as well as local governments and it reflected the various financial
needs of voters/citizensin the provision of local public goods.
This section explores a view on the nature of central and local
government relationships in postwar Japanese local public finance. Central -
local government relationships in local public finance can theoretically be
classified as one of the following three types.2)
First, we can assume that a monolithic authoritarian government, that
is, a 'supreme power' controls the judiciary, the legislature and the
administration of all central and local government.^ Negotiation between
central and local governments is limited under this authoritarian
government model due to prohibitively high judicial costs. The
authoritarian government can influence local governments to achieve
specific national goals such as economic growth and the maintenance of
public order. Countries requiring macro level coordination such as the
direction of national resources intensively to specific industries often
utilizethis type of fiscal management.
Under this authoritarian government, local governments can secure
benefits from the central government, for example, through low-cost
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transfers, as long as they cooperate with the supreme power's policy goals.
However, financial management under the authoritarian government often
leads to inefficiencies in the provision of local public goods, especially
when there are wide regional differences in preferences for local services.
This is because it is unlikely that information about local financial needs
is perfectly transferred to the supreme power.
However, local autonomy is guaranteed under the constitution and
local autonomy law in postwar Japanese local public finance. The
hallmarks of local autonomy can be seen in the settlement of local
assemblies, direct elections of governors of local governments, local
administration and local asset management by local governments, and
settling ordinances within laws. This infiltration of local autonomy in
Japanese local public finance enabled local governments to work out
various regional means of attracting industry capital during the 1960s and
in applying environmental and welfare policies during the 1970s
(Muramatsu 1988). Thus, it is not appropriate to categorize postwar
Japanese local fiscal management as representative of this authoritarian
management model.
A second model to consider is rule - dependent fiscal management,
which is commonly assumed in the theory of fiscal federalism. The theory
of fiscal federalism such as in the decentralization theorem (Oates 1972)
and the voting with feet theorem (Tiebout 1956) has shown that efficiency
in the provision of local public goods is guaranteed under a competitive
local government environment within a regulated structure. The theory
necessitates the establishment of fiscal and administrative rules which
clearly demarcates government functions whereby, for example resource
allocation, income distribution, and macro-economic policy are the
responsibility of central government and the remaining resource allocation
functions are assigned to local governments. Thus the central - local
financial relationship under the fiscal federalism theory is limited to
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corrective measures in the case of inefficient resource allocation caused by
people's myopic mobility and by independent regional choices about local
tax rates and local tax bases.
Japanese postwar local public finance management, however, has not
been based on a clear separation of functions between central and local
governments in their administration and financial management. Even
though local autonomy is guaranteed in the constitution and local
autonomy law, a high degree of integration between central and local
governments has been common throughout the postwar period. The
administrative bodies at both central and local government levels have
cooperatively played a significant role in formulating the substance of the
legislative agendas of the Japanese local tax system. This dominance of
administrative bodies has partly been due to features such as the close ties
between the legislature and the administration, and because of the low
profile the judicial process has taken in the arena of local public finance.
Thus, we can say that central - local government relationships in
Japanese local public finance belong to a third type categorized as relation
-dependent fiscal management. This model is located between the firstand
the second types described above. This relation-dependent nature of the
relationship between central and local governments has been maintained
by long-term relationships between these bodies fostered by means such
as financial interdependency, personnel interchange and administrative
cooperation. This allowed both central and local governments to have
frequent opportunities for exploring subsequent negotiations to modify
prototype systems such as those in local tax mechanism and
intergovernmental grants schemes and to coordinate their conflicting
interests.
Shoup local tax reform
It is widely known that the postwar Japanese tax system was based on the
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tax recommendations of the Shoup Mission in 1949 (Ishi 1987). The
Shoup mission visited Japan at the request of the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers and submitted a reform proposal on Japanese
taxation afterintensive study.4) The drastic reform of the local tax system
recommended by the Shoup mission in 1949 established the Japanese
local tax system as the basis of a new financial system for postwar
economic and social reconstruction.
The recommendations were severely critical of the prewar Japanese
public finance system which was characterized by serious weaknesses and
problems in its financing methods as well as its administration. These
problems were demonstrated by unnecessarily complex and overlapping
functions and the allocation of responsibilities among different levels of
governments, inappropriate distribution of financial resources among
different levels of governments, shortfalls in securing financial resources
to undertake essential local expenditure, ad hoc decision making by the
central government in the provision of intergovernmental grants, and the
severe limitations on the issuance of bonds by local authorities.5)
The Shoup mission's recommendations, therefore, covered overall
reform of local public finance such as administrative and financial
reallocation between central and local governments, abolition of central
control of local governments through specific purpose grants, relaxation of
regulations governing the issue of local bonds as well as reorganization of
the local tax system. The reform aimed to institute strictfinancial rules
governing local public finance on the basis of 'grass roots democracy' a
system which was totally different from the prewar centralized fiscal
system.
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The following principles were emphasized to achieve a healthy local
tax system.
"1 The tax system should be simple. The number of different taxes
should be held to a minimum, and the taxes levied should be of a
kind that can be readily understood by taxpayers.
2 Each local tax should be capable of effective local administration.
The base of the tax must be clearly assignable to particular local
areas and must not involve highly technical administrative problems.
3 So far as practicable without losing too much in efficiency of tax
administration, and without resorting to inferior types of taxes, there
should be separation of tax sources among the national government,
the prefectures, and the municipalities. With such separation, the
citizen would be able to fix the politicalresponsibility for the amount
of taxes levied upon him and for the manner in which they are
administered.
4 The local units should have the power to raise or lower tax rates
in response to the needs and desires of local electorates.", in Shoup
Mission (1949) Report on Japanese Taxation, General Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, A9
Under the report's recommendations, it was considered essential to
establish a rational local tax system in Japan by removing the local tax
system's dependency on national tax, by simplifying local tax rules and
by giving priority to the principles of benefit taxation (Fujita 1976). Thus
drastic reform of local tax was proposed, including provisions (1) to
secure local tax revenue, specifically by increasing tax revenue of
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Table 1 Local Tax Revenues, Fiscal Years 1949-50 and 1950-51
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municipal governments, (2) to abolish the surtax system by separating tax
bases between prefectures, and municipalities, (3) to rationalize
complicated minor local tax institutions,(4) to increase the weights of
municipal inhabitant tax and fixed asset tax.
Table 1 shows a comparison of local tax revenue before and after the
1950 Shoup local tax reform.
First, the share of local tax in total tax revenue increased from 18.3
percent in 1949 to 24.8 percent in 1950. The increase was not enough, but
apparently enabled an expansion of local tax revenue. In the composition
of local tax revenue, the share of municipalities increased from 49.0
percent in 1949 to 63.0 percent in 1950. The table shows that
municipalities were regarded in the reform as important managing bodies
for local public finance.
Second, there was a change in the role of the surtax system before
the Shoup local tax reform. Until 1936, prefectures imposed a surtax on
national taxes like land tax, rent tax, business tax and mining tax; until
1949, local municipalities imposed a surtax on prefectural taxes like land
tax, house tax, business tax, special income tax, mining tax, admission tax,
liquor tax and electricityand gas taxes. The surtax system had weakened
residents' consciousness of the financial burden of local public service and,
so made the fiscal accountability of local governments ambiguous. The
Shoup local tax reform abolished all these surtaxes so as to establish the
independent tax principle and to remove this financial dependency on
upper tier bodies.
Third, the reform swept away the dependence of local governments
on minor tax sources. Thirty municipal tax items were reduced to 10, and
21 prefectural tax items were reduced to 7 (Hashimoto 1968: 87). In
particular, the share of revenues from business (VAT), admission, and
entertainment taxes in prefectural taxes revenue was 83.6 percent, and the
share of revenues from municipal inhabitant tax and fixed asset tax in
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municipal tax revenue was 79.3 percent.
Fourth, independent tax bases were allocated to prefecture and local
governments to clarify the fiscal accountability of local governments. The
reforms abolished the previous prefectural inhabitant tax, land and house
tax, and business tax and allocated VAT to prefectural tax. Municipal
inhabitant tax, the basis of which is residents' income, and fixed asset tax,
based on the capital price of land, buildings and depreciation assets were
allocated to municipalities, which made it possible to increase municipal
governments' revenue substantially.
The Shoup local tax reform succeeded in establishing clear fiscal and
administrative rules in the local tax system, bringing accountability to
both prefectural and municipal governments which enabled them to carry
out efficient tax collection to commensurate with the local residents' tax
burden. In this sense, the local tax system on the basis of Shoup
Recommendations can be characterized as an important prototype of the
postwar Japanese local tax system.
Modification of the Shoup local tax system
It is impossible to finance local public finance through local tax revenue
alone. Various financial measures such as intergovernmental grants and
local bonds normally complement local tax revenue by providing a stable
and efficient funding source for local governments. To guarantee stable
financial resources for local governments, fiscal equalization standards
have been widely taken into account with the emphasis on the
complementary nature between the local tax system and the general
revenue grants scheme in Japanese local public finance.
Theoretically, two types of fiscal equalization can bridge the gap
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of local governments
(Mathews 1977 and King 1984). The first,a vertical fiscal equalization,
aims to adjust the fiscal imbalance between different tiers of government,
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between the central government and local governments, and between
upper- and lower-tier governments within local governments. The second
is a horizontal fiscal equalization, which aims at lessening the disparities
among the same tier of government. The degree of fiscal equalization
standards depends on the nation's distributive policy.
Under the prewar Japanese local public finance system, a local
distribution tax system was established in 1940, aimed at fiscal
equalization in local public financed Total funding of the local
distribution tax system was linked to national taxes such as income and
corporate taxes, and admission tax and entertainment tax. Tax sharing was
limited to income and corporate taxes after 1947. Half of this local
distribution tax was allocated to prefectures and municipalities in
proportion to their local financial needs. The rest of the tax was
distributed disproportionately, allowing for differing local revenue
capacity. The sharing rates were revised by negotiations between central
and local governments depending on the financial conditions of both
governments.
The local distribution tax system by itself could not guarantee stable
financial resources to local governments. Unexpected changes in the
amount of local distribution tax collected by the central government
forced local governments to rely on other means of funding such as
specific purpose grants and contributions from local taxes to maintain
fiscal equalization.
The Shoup recommendations admitted the importance of the fiscal
equalization mechanism but proposed drastic reform in the local
distribution tax system. This was because the arbitrary nature of decisions
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about the total amount of tax combined with its distribution pattern had
caused serious deficiencies in local governments' financial capacities.(See
Shoup report A21.) The recommendations proposed an alternative to the
equalization grants scheme by providing the necessary resources for local
governments from the national budget.7) A revenue sharing rather than a
tax sharing method was put forward in the scheme. The recommendations
proposed a change in the method of calculating and distributing grants on
the basis of estimates of the basic financial needs and financial capacities
of local governments by the Local Public Finance Commission.8)
Equalization grants were intended to compensate for any gap between the
basic financial needs and the financial capacities of particular local
governments. The full compensation method to finance financial shortages
of local governments was recommended in the equalization grants scheme,
which forced substantial financial concessions from the central
government to local public finance.
Fiscal equalization, however, was not attained in a satisfactory way
under the Shoup's equalization grants scheme. In particular, it caused
serious fiscal shortages in local government finance. First, vertical fiscal
equalization was violated due to the failure of the full compensation
scheme to make up for the financial shortages of local governments.
Table 2 sets out the accumulating deficits of local governments in the
early 1950s. The number of local governments recording deficits and the
amount of their accumulation increased under the equalization grants
scheme. In 1952, 36 out of 46 prefectural governments (78.3 percent)
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recorded deficitsin the net excess of revenue. The accumulated deficit in
prefectures was 13.8 billion yen. In municipalities, 2,632 out of 10,041
bodies (26.2 percent) showed deficits and recorded 1.63 billion in
accumulated deficits.In 1953, the number of deficit bodies as well as the
accumulated deficits in prefectural governments substantially increased.
The number of deficit bodies reduced in municipalities but the
accumulated deficitincreased.
Table 2 Accumulating deficitsof local governments in the early 1950s
Second, the limited financial resources available through equalization
grants weakened the effectiveness of horizontal fiscal equalization. Figure
1 shows the Gini coefficients of per capita prefectural tax collection and
per capita prefectural revenue with equalization grants during 1950 - 53.
The sharp increase in Gini coefficients of per capita local tax revenue
shows that the Shoup local tax reform magnified the regional disparitiesin
prefectural tax revenue. Irrespective of whether large financial resources
were transferred to financially poor prefectures through the equalization
grants, there was no clear improvement in the level of horizontal
equalization before and after the shift to the equalization grants scheme
(As seen in the Gini coefficients of per capita prefectural revenue with
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Figure 1 GINI coefficients of per capita local revenue (prefectures)
equalizationgrants).
Similarly, Table 3 examines the results of horizontal fiscal
equalizationin the municipalities.The table presents the distribution
patternsof per capita municipal tax collectionand per capita municipal
tax collectionwith equalizationgrants (general revenue grants) between
citiesand towns during 1949 - 53. The sharp improvements in both per
capita municipal tax revenue of towns relativeto those of cities(from
0.48 in 1949 to 0.51 in 1950) and the amounts afterequalizationgrants
revenue (from 0.58 in 1949 to 0.65 in 1950) show that there was an
improvement in the horizontalfiscalimbalance between citiesand towns
in 1950. However, the widening revenue gaps between citiesand towns in
successive years and the instabilityof the equalization show that the
Shoup local tax reform failedto achieve horizontalfiscalequalization.
These unsatisfactoryfiscalequalizationresultsunder the Shoup local
tax reform can be explained by administrative failures in the
implementation of equalizationgrants,by the dependent attitudeof local
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Table 3 Horizontal fiscalequalisation: municipal level
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public finance towards equalization grants and also by the constrained
economic situation at that time (Fujita 1978; Maruyama 1985).
First, full compensation was not realized through the provision of
equalization grants. In practice, the total amount of grants allocated to
local governments was cut in negotiations between central and local
governments, which meant the incomplete application of the system to
attain the necessary level of financial equalization.^ An additional clause
was included in the equalization grants law in 1952 which legally allowed
the central government to reduce equalization grants payments to local
governments in cases where local governments had neglected their
administrative obligations and services had declined.10)
Second, the dependence of local governments on equalization grants
became the cause of the revenue shortages of local public finance. The
excessive expectations of local governments that the equalization grants
would fully compensate for shortages of local public finance had
weakened their incentive to collect local tax revenue in an efficient
manner.
Third, the economic and financial constraints in the 1950s also caused
unexpectedly large financial shortages in local governments. The Japanese
economy was caught up in the world-wide recession after the Korean war
and it remained in recession in the early 1950s. The slowdown of the
economy could not secure sufficient revenue for both central and local
public finance. The postwar reform of local public finance such as
changes to the education and police systems necessitated a rapid increase
in expenditures. This gap between revenue and expenditure also caused
serious financial shortages among local governments.
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Both the central and local governments explored adjustment
possibilitiesto overcome the inadequacies of fiscal equalization afterwards.
In practice, the initiativein reform was taken by the Ministry of Finance
(the central government) and the Home Affairs Agencyn) (representing the
voice of local governments). Reform of the local tax system was proposed
repeatedly in the early 1950s on account of its institutional
complementarity with fiscal equalization. This was because the increasing
financial burden of equalization grants motivated the central government
to seek a way to alleviate the regional disparities in local revenues
through local government concessions within local tax system. The lack of
stable financial resources for local governments also necessitated then-
exploration of an additional resource opportunities through reform of the
local tax system.
Revisions to the local tax system during 1951 and 1953 aimed to
increase local tax revenue. They were: (1) the expansion of the tax base
of municipal inhabitant tax to include corporations in 1951; (2) the
application of a withholding tax system to salary income in municipal
inhabitant tax in 1951; (3) the postponement of the introduction of the
value added tax from 1952 until 1954.12)
There was a drastic modification of the local tax system in 1954.
New taxes such as prefectural inhabitant tax, business tax, real property
acquisition tax and prefectural tobacco consumption tax were introduced
to enlarge the tax base of prefectural governments.13) The municipal
tobacco consumption tax was also introduced at the municipal level. There
was a reduction of municipal inhabitant tax and fixed asset tax rates in
municipal taxes to alleviate the tax burden of inhabitant tax and real
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property acquisition tax which had recently been imposed at the
prefectural level. Local transfer taxes such as an admission transfer tax
and a gasoline transfer tax were established to correct the fiscal disparities
among prefectural revenues.14)
Equalization grants were changed to a local allocation tax in 1954.15)
The local allocation tax was based on the tax sharing system in which
financial resources are linked with national taxes (income tax, corporate
tax and liquor tax). The link with three income-elastic national taxes
provided stable funds for local governments with reduced costs in
negotiation with central government. The system maintained the
distribution method of equalization grants being based on the estimation
of the basic financial needs and the basic financial revenues of local
governments. However, these changes in the grants scheme also led to a
reduction in the total payment of grants from 13,930 million yen in 1953
to 12,380 million yen in 1954.
These changes in local public finance meant a reduction in the central
government's financial burden that would have been entailed by
increasing equalization grants and also the achievement of fiscal
equalization through assistance from the local tax system to mitigate
revenue disparities between local governments.
Table 4 compares local tax revenue structures between 1953, 1954
and the latest 1997. The figures correspond to the Shoup local tax system,
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Table 4 Local tax revenues, fiscalyears 1953, 1954 and 1997
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the after-Shoup local tax system and the present local tax system.
First, new taxes such as prefectural inhabitant tax, real property
acquisition tax, prefectural tobacco tax, and local entertainment tax were
new additions to prefectural finance. There was an increase in the tax
revenue of prefectural governments of 15.2 billion yen. Second, both tax
rates and the per capita rates were reduced in municipal inhabitant tax in
order to reduce the financial burden of taxpayers with the introduction of
a prefectural inhabitant tax.16)It reduced the municipal inhabitant tax
revenue by 14.5 billion yen. Tobacco tax was for the first time at the
municipal level to compensate for this financial reduction. This is led to a
net increase in tax revenue for municipal governments of 14.7 billion yen.
Third, the current 1997 local tax structure maintains the prototype of the
after-Shoup local tax system by increasing the reliance on prefectural
inhabitant tax and real property acquisition tax at prefectural level.
Thus, the main policy goal of the local tax reform in the early 1950s
was directed to achieve tax payer equity and to keep revenue adequacy of
local governments. First, the establishment of new prefectural taxes was
aimed at retrieving prefecture revenue resources which had been
substantially reduced under the Shoup local tax reform. This introduction
of income-elastic inhabitant taxes both by prefectural and municipal
governments built in a revenue mechanism which relied on the growth of
the economy as well as increases in personal income.
Second, local tax reform tried to alleviate the problem of tax payer
equity among local governments.17) (1) The establishment of prefectural
inhabitant tax and prefectural tobacco tax with their narrow revenue
disparity between local governments was supposed to alleviate the large
regional disparities in business tax revenue. (2) The introduction of a
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municipal tobacco tax with its evenly distributed tax base among local
governments was also considered as a means of alleviating the fiscal
disparitiesbetween municipalities.
The reform was not successful in the short term due to its limited
effectiveness. First, the after-Shoup local tax system did not guarantee a
substantial increase in local tax collection.18' The share of local tax
revenue in total tax revenue increased by 1.9 percentage points (from 26.3
percent in 1953 to 28.2 percent in 1954). Shortages in local tax revenue
continued and accumulating deficits of local governments were common.
The successive deficits of prefectures continued until 1956, and municipal
deficits continued until 1959 (Table 5). This was partly due to a series of
recessions in the late 1950s.
Table 5 Deficitsin net excess of revenues oflocal governments
Second, the amendment of the Shoup local tax system did not result
in significantimprovements in horizontal fiscal equalization.This is
shown by the similarlevels of Gini coefficientsof local tax revenue
before and afterthe 1954 local tax reform. In 1954, the coefficientwas
－160 －
0.247 and it was 0.250 in 1955.
The failure to make up for the financial shortfallsin local government
revenue in this period compelled the central government (the Home
Affairs Agency) to intervene in local public finance by the use of such
tools as the establishment of chiho zaiseisaiken sokushin tokubetsusochi
ho (laws to restructure local public finance). The government was com-
pelled to issue local governments bonds for local governments which pre-
pared restoration plans.
Political coordination between central and local governments
This section attempts to model coordinating processes between the central
government and local governments. The political coordination under the
relation dependent central-local relationships enabled to carry out repeated
reforms of local tax system in the postwar Japanese public finance.19)
The process can be described simply in the following six steps
outlining the formation of rules and the responses of local governments.
Step 1 establishment of the ex ante rule
There was a substantial reform in the local tax system in 1950 on
the basis of the Shoup recommendations. The Shoup local tax
system provided the basic rules for local public finance, a system
which differed totally from the prewar system. The rule can be
defined as an ex ante rule.
Step 2 local governments' response
Local governments took decisions on the basis of the ex ante rule.
Local governments established new fiscal and administrative
institutions using the mechanisms for tax administration and
collection drawn up under the Shoup local tax system. As a result,
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some local governments improved their fiscal performances,
achieving high fiscal accountability. However, other local
governments had poor fiscal performance because of an over-
reliance on equalization grants to compensate fully for their
financial necessities.
Step 3 uncertainty in the economic and social environment
The economic situation in the early 1950s was unstable. Though
there was an expansion of the Japanese economy caused by
supplying the US military with munitions requirements for the
Korean War, the boom soon stopped at the end of the war and it
was followed by a world-wide depression. In public finance, the
rapid expansion of expenditure at the central and local government
levels to achieve postwar reform necessitated an increase in
financial resources. On the other hand, the continuation of the
Dodge line brought serious financial constraints to both central and
local governments. (The balanced budget principle was firmly
enforced by the central government until the early 1960s.) As a
result, the provision of equalization grants was limited and full
compensation principle settling the fiscal shortages of local
governments was not guaranteed by the equalization grants scheme.
Local governments had to face serious fiscal deficits and regional
revenue disparities widened.
Step 4 ex post negotiations for local tax reform
Local governments represented by the Home Affairs Agency,
negotiated with the central government (Ministry of Finance) for
the reform of local taxation in the early 1950s.
Step 5 establishment of the ex post rule
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There was a drastic modification of the local tax system in 1954.
This modification incorporated the local tax system into a
comprehensive system of fiscal equalization. The ex post system
established in the early 1950s was maintained throughout the
postwar period.
Step 6 local governments' responses
Local governments made decisions on the basis of the ex post rule.
The following argument explores the reasons why ex post
negotiations were possible after uncertainties were resolved in Step 4. Let
us assume that the pay-offs of the central government and local
governments are c and 1 with regard to the changing local tax system. We
assume that the original pay-offs of local and the central governments
under ex ante rule are represented by lo and co.2O)
Let Lea be a set of ex post performances of local governments under
the ex ante rule, where Lea = {ao, ai, 2a, ..,an}. Let Lep (f, s) be a set of
ex post performances of local governments under the ex post rule, where f
represents the ex ante institutional framework formulated by local
governments, s represents states of nature. If Lea = Lep (f, s), the ex ante
rule would prevail. (This was the situation which emerged during the
period 1950 - 53). Local governments would choose action ao. The social
outcome is shown by S (f, ao, s) = so. Local governments evaluate the
outcome lo and the central government evaluates the outcome Co.
If decisions by both the central government and local governments
(insiders) were to result in a new fiscal rule, local governments would
choose a performance ai, which would provide a pay-off vector (li, ci)
according to the same logic. The pay-off vector realized by the new
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policy would depend on the new fiscal rule, the ex ante rule, and also the
realized state of nature.
Both the central and local governments pay-off relationships are
shown in Figure 2a b The disagreement pay-off vector is shown by No.
No represents maintaining the Shoup local tax system. The ex post rule
providing pay-off Ni is likely to be chosen by both governments in the
case of ex post negotiations. The ex post rule providing pay-off N2 would
not be chosen.
Starting from this basic understanding of both governments'
negotiation opportunities, it is possible to consider several factors which
would enlarge ex post policy change opportunities. The factors are
determined by the relation-dependent fiscal management of Japanese local
public finance. They are (1) the high cost of litigation,(2) the existence of
side payments, (3) the long-term relationships between game players
(Okuno-Fujiwara 1996). Of these, the third factor seems to be the most
important in the context of the Japanese local tax system.
Relation dependent fiscal management produces repetitive interactions
between the central government and local governments. Both governments
conceive of the negotiations in Step 4 (the modification of the local tax
system) as a single stage in the entire repeated game. That means the
regime provides a different social outcome under different states of nature.
In the context of the Japanese local tax system, the introduction of income-
elastic local taxes may produce different outcomes in tax revenue
collection according as the performance of the economy.
In Figure 2a b, Ph, Pn, Pi represent pay-offs combinations of both the
central government and local governments under the ex post local tax
system. The system dependent on the growth of personal and corporate
income provides the following strategies and pay-off combinations for
both the central government and local governments. Ph reveals a pay-offs
combination showing the strategy mix that the high growth of the
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Figure 2a (1954 and high growth period)
Figure 2b (recent movement of fiscal decentralisation)
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economy guarantees a high pay-off levels for both the central government
and local governments. This is because the high growth of the economy
enables an increase in local inhabitant tax revenue according as the
growth of income level which will bring a reduction of revenue disparity
between local governments and also an increase in local tax revenue. Pn
and Pi reveal pay-offs combinations showing that the normal and low
level growth guarantees respective pay-off levels for both the central
government and local governments. The low growth of the economy
provides relatively less pay-offs for both the central government and local
governments. This is because the increase in financial burden for the
central government adjusting horizontal fiscal equalization and also
decrease in local tax revenue reduce both governments' pay-off levels.
As is explained in Okuno-Fujiwara (1996), the application of the Folk
theorem enlarges the opportunity of ex post negotiations between the
central government and local governments.21) The situation is shown in
Figure 2a. Even though the ex post fiscal rule provides a lower pay-off
level to local governments in the period of economic recession (The
situation is shown by Pi), the cooperative establishment of the ex post
local tax system between central and local governments may be possible if
we take account of the long term relationships between central and local
governments and also both governments are sufficiently patient. This is
because the convex combination of pay-offs Pm remaining in the set of




The relation-dependent nature of the relationship between Japan's central
government and its local governments was a dominant feature of
organizational decision making in establishing the local tax system in
early postwar Japan. There was a high degree of administrative and
financial integration between the central government and local
governments, as well as local autonomy, a concept that is enshrined in the
Japanese constitution and local autonomy law.
The Japanese local tax system underwent a significant reform in 1950
on the basis of the Shoup recommendations, as did other local financial
systems, for example, an equalization grants scheme and a local
government bond system were established. The reform delineated clear
fiscal rules that clarified the fiscal accountability of local governments.
The significance of the reform is stillacknowledged in many academic
works, which note its contribution to the strengthening of local autonomy
and the realization of economic principles such as equity, economic
efficiency, and simplicity.
However, the financial constraints on both the central government
and local governments at that time meant that convincing outcomes in
fiscal equalization such as securing stable financial resources for local
governments and correcting fiscal disparities between local governments
could not be achieved. The institutional changes in the local tax system in
the mid- 1950s transformed the Shoup local tax reform into the prototype
of the current form. The aim of the Japanese local tax system was to
pursue a stable financial resource base for local governments partly by
expanding the local tax system on the basis of regional economic growth
and partly by collecting revenue from newly established inhabitant taxes
to improve the horizontal fiscalimbalances between local governments.
The reforms, similar to the Shoup local tax system, could not provide
satisfactory results in alleviating regional tax burden and in securing
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adequate revenue for local governments. The central government had to
strengthen its administrative controls over local public finance to
overcome the accumulating deficits such as by streaming local expenditure
and issuing local bonds for local governments that had prepared
restoration plans.
The political coordination of local tax reforms between the central
government and local governments continued in the development of the
Japanese economy, a subject that we study in a successive work (Hanai,
Tajika and Yui 2000). The local tax system experienced a windfall
revenue increase during the growth period of the Japanese economy.
Local governments could manage revenue adequacy by relying on
corporate incomes for their tax revenue. The central government,
maintaining its leadership in the central-local bargaining, could offer
funding sources to local governments for the purpose of economic
improvement. The coordination failure between the central government
and local governments in achieving economic efficiency became evident
after the slowdown of the Japanese economy. Local governments, having
difficulty in raising revenue through their own taxes, have depended
heavily on financial transfers from the central government. The central
government, through its discretionary intergovernmental transfers, has
bailed out these local governments. The failure highlights incentive
problems in managing local public finance in an efficient way.
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